The tectonic shift rightwards in European politics was heralded by Marine Le Pen in France and Giorgia Meloni in Italy just about a year and a half ago in 2022. It was followed a year later by Geert Wilders’ strong showing in the Dutch general elections. They were treated as political pariahs, and their politics as mere bubbles of temporary populism, by the mainstream parties in power since long, who were unwilling to allow them into ruling coalitions. There is a deeper streak of general dissatisfaction – around a wide range of issues, some openly articulated and others only in whispers of cascading amplification – that such parties were exploiting, which the ruling elites living in their own echo chambers were ignoring.

Such populism invariably mellows when brought into government but grows stronger in opposition, especially if deep-rooted socio-economic malaise is not effectively addressed (indeed, as Nepal’s crass case with the communists and Maoists shows, they quickly give up their radicalism). This past month’s European Union elections as well as those in France and the UK, with the rightwing surging to their best performance yet, proves the point. What happened? And what does it mean for far-away countries like Nepal in a globalized world? These questions, which will roil the political class across the globe and determine their shifting stances in the years ahead, are well-worth reflecting over.

The elections to the EU parliament, while having not much immediate influence in the national scene of individual countries, are nevertheless a major bellwether of the public mood in the continent. Rightwing groups such as Germany’s Alliance for Deutschland (AfD) led Sovereigntists, France’s National Rally as well as Netherland’s Party for Freedom led Patriots and Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia massively increased their seat share. The situation was repeated in Greece, Bulgaria and Czech Republic. These parties are united in their opposition to the flood of immigration from Africa and the Middle-East, erosion of national culture, values and identity, as well as excessive interference from the bureaucrats in Brussels. While they hold differing (often contradictory) views on Ukraine and Gaza conflicts, they are perceived as broadly opposed to the ruling elite’s common position supporting those wars and favour peace.

The success of Le Pen’s National Rally so unnerved France’s President Immanuel Macron that he dissolved the parliament where he enjoyed decent support to call for a snap election to clip the rightwing surge. It turned out to be a major miscalculation. France has a strange system of two-phase elections one week apart, where the results of the first phase are announced allowing parties to form new alliances and deals to buck the trend. (This is unlike in India’s seven-phase, month-and-a-half long elections where all votes are counted only at the end of the voting and not even exist polling is allowed to be publicized so as not to unduly influence voters.)

It seems this system was adopted by the Fifth French Republic following the disastrous impasse of the post-WW2 Fourth Republic and the Algerian war of cessation and independence. The motive behind this arrangement was to allow a second phase regrouping to keep the then very strong French communists out of power. Only this time a half century later, it was used to gang up against Le Pen’s right to keep it out of government. Unfortunately, the motley coalitions only ended with the left New Popular Front securing first place and displacing Macron’s own centrist Ensemble grouping. Le Pen’s party still got the highest popular vote share of 37% but bagged only 142 seats (25% of the legislative total), Macron’s 25% with 161 seats (28%), and the disparate left coalition’s 26% with 188 seats (33%), leaving France almost ungovernable. The undemocratic disjuncture between popular votes and the actual number seats in parliament is now a topic of growing debate in Western democracies that will be discussed further below.

The situation repeated itself in the UK. Like Macron in France, British prime minister Rishi Sunak called an unnecessary early general election miscalculating his party’s growing unpopularity (similar to what David Cameroon had risked earlier with the Brexit referendum thus eventually gifting UK with unstable governments since 2019). The Conservatives were decimated with many of their stalwarts losing the elections, and the Labour party won a very comfortable absolute majority. It would seem like a vindication of the near millennia Westminster parliamentary democracy running on tradition without even a written constitution. However, while perhaps not as bad as France, the tectonic rumblings underneath do portend uncomfortable debates ahead.

Three dissident parties have shown unexpected strong support that will call into question the comfortable two-party (uni-party not politically any different as has been derisively said) stability in the days ahead. The first-past-the-post electoral system has given Labour a massive majority in the lowest electoral turnout since 1928 even as its vote share was lower than when Labour under Jeremy Corbyn lost in 2017 and lower than what Le Pen’s National Rally got in France! Liberal Democrats have done well with 12% vote share and 11% seats as the most balanced outcome. Nigel Farage’s hastily cobbled up Reform UK – which brings up deep-rooted problems in British politics – has won more votes (14%) than the LibDems but have only 1% of the seats and the Greens too with 7% popular votes got only 1% of the seats. They, together with ousted socialist Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn who won as independent, promise to make the Commons debate definitely interesting as they hold prime minister Kier Starmer’s feet to the fire on a range of issues from migration and jobs to the economy and global relations.

Across the Atlantic “pond” as is said, US election between an anti-establishment Trump versus an establishmentarian but increasingly sclerotic Biden is moving from circus to tragedy. (These lines are being written just as news has broken an hour ago about the assassination attempt on Trump, something that can only fuel his conspiracy-charged base!) Unlike Iran and Russia (whose directly elected leaders are called “autocrats” by the Collective West, who also remain silent as Pakistan’s elected prime minister Imran Khan is overthrown by the military and jailed), Americans do not directly elect their president: they do it through the “electoral college” mechanics which does not accurately reflect the popular will. Otherwise Hillary Clinton who won almost three million more votes than Trump would not have lost the presidency to him in the electoral college count.

Even more serious is the fact that the winner is not necessarily the one who got the most votes but who raised the most money from rich corporations, making America more of an expensive plutocracy than a mass-participatory democracy. This is evident in the ease with which unwanted (to the plutocracy) candidates such as Bernie Sanders or Robert Kennedy Jr are sidelined early without being provide a fair chance to put themselves up as candidates within their party.

The underlying stresses behind this Western electoral turmoil stem from a range of causes. Provoking Russia by violating NATO non-expansion promise beyond 1991 borders and conducting regime change in Ukraine towards that expansion in 2014 has resulted in the tragedy we see today. Its flip side is the weaponization of the dollar-dominated financial system via rampant politically motivated sanctions (together with issues like human rights and democracy). It has only made Russia stronger (even the World Bank admits that now).

Following the US in its anti-Russia crusade has made Germany and other Western European countries economically, diplomatically and militarily weaker accelerating the search for an alternative to the dollar as global trade and reserve currency. Just look at the disastrous Swiss “Ukraine peace” conclave against Russia that fizzled out so badly. Blind support of Israeli genocide in Gaza has alienated not just much of the Arab world but rest of the Global South as well from the Collective West. Stoking conflict in the Indo-Pacific against China is not going too well either for the US and EU.

This shift in global political outlook is being expressed through the stampede towards BRICS by many powerful economies of the Global South from the Middle-East to South-East Asia. The recent attempt to build a new push against Russia and China by the US at the 75th NATO anniversary was openly opposed by NATO members themselves such as Turkey, Spain and Slovakia. Others took a more “wait-and-see what happens in November in the US elections” attitude, having seen the organization’s failure not just in Ukraine but from Vietnam and Afghanistan to Iraq and Libya. The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Astana and Putin-Modi bromance with strong Chinese support for it signaled the emergence of a powerful parallel Eurasian block.

For Nepal, three big lessons emerge. First, imported, Western-inspired models of democracy do not work in our historical and institutional context: they only result in crass kleptocracy as three past such attempts of 1959, 1990 and 2008 have amply proven. The coming generation of Nepalis have a lot of work to do discovering one suited to our clime and times. Second, Collective West is in turmoil and decline, and it can hardly be looked up to for governance and development wisdom. The Age of Foreign Aid is over; countries like Nepal have to find their own path (and resources) towards those goals. Third, all these worthy aims can be pursued if we maintain strict neutrality in dealing with strong neighbours, and avoid becoming another Ukraine. That requires making sure we get rid of our clowns and kleptocrats occupying high offices!